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1.  Introduction  
 
  According to Alan Greenspan (2003), “Uncertainty is not just an important 
feature of the monetary policy landscape; it is the defining characteristic of that 
landscape”. In fact, the recognition that all monetary policymakers must bow to the 
presence of uncertainty appears to underlie Greenspan’s (2003) view that central banks 
are driven to a “risk management” approach to policy, whereby policymakers “need to 
reach a judgement about the probabilities, costs, and the benefits of the various possible 
outcomes under alternative choices for policy”. 
  Uncertainty comes in many forms. One obvious form is simply ignorance about 
the shocks that will disturb the economy in the future (oil prices, for example). Other 
forms of uncertainty, perhaps more insidious can also have resounding implications on 
how policy should be conducted, three of which are data uncertainty, parameter 
uncertainty, and model uncertainty.  
  Data uncertainty 
  One form of uncertainty that is ever present is data uncertainty. Consider the US 
economy’s real GDP. For each and every quarter of the year, three estimates of real GDP 
are released: an advance estimate, a preliminary estimate, and a final estimate. As 
successive estimates are released, a greater fraction of the estimate is actually measured 
and less is imputed. But some imputation is involved even for the final GDP released. In 
fact, the final GDP estimate is not final. Every year a benchmark revision occurs in which 
previous estimates of real GDP are revised, going back several years. Try as we might, 
due to measurement difficulties of one sort or another, we can never know what the 
economy’s real GDP actually is, or was. This is data uncertainty.    2
 Parameter  uncertainty 
  Distinct from data uncertainty is parameter uncertainty. Economists use models to 
understand how the economy might respond when stimulated in certain ways, and to 
create forecasts. These economic models contain parameters that govern the interactions 
that occur within the model, such as how sensitive consumption or investment is to a 1 
percentage point change in the real interest rate. While economists can use statistical 
techniques to try to estimate these parameters, ultimately their value remains very much 
uncertain quantities  
  Model uncertainty and model averaging  
  While there is uncertainty about the data that enter into economic models and 
about the parameters that govern economic models, the fact that economists often 
approach macroeconomic data armed with different models of the economy suggests that 
uncertainty, or ambiguity, about the model could also be potentially important. From a 
policymaking perspective, it is quite possible, indeed reasonable, to think that 
policymakers may have several models at their disposal, perhaps reflecting competing 
economic theories, each of which could justifiably be viewed as a reasonable 
approximation of the interrelationships at work in the actual economy.  
  A policy can be made “robust” to model uncertainty by designing it to perform 
well on average across all of the available fully specified models rather than to reign 
supreme in any particular model (McCallum 1988). This model-averaging approach is 
taken in Levin, Wieland, and Williams (2003), who use five disparate macroeconometric 
models of the U. S. economy to study how best to conduct monetary policy when facing 
model uncertainty. Focusing on simple rules in which the Federal Reserve is assumed to 
set the federal funds rate in response to inflation, the output gap (that is, the difference 
between actual output and an estimate of potential output), and the lagged federal funds 
rate, they identify a particular policy rule that is able to perform well across all five 
models. The policy rule that they identify is one that contains a short-term forecast of 
future inflation, incorporates a large response to the output gap, and that involves 
considerable “gradualism,” or interest rate smoothing.    3
  Although the model averaging approach allows us to get a handle on how to think 
about model uncertainty at the level of the policymaker, it is less clear what the approach 
has to say about the views of the households and firms that make up the economy.  
Model uncertainty and robust control  
  The model-averaging approach to model uncertainty is not possible when 
policymakers cannot articulate and specify the various models that they wish to be robust 
against and therefore cannot assign probabilities to each of the models. This situation is 
known as Knightian uncertainty (Knight 1921). In such environments, the robust control 
approach comes into play. Robust control suggests that policymakers should formulate 
policy to guard against the worst form of model misspecification that is possible. Thus, 
rather than focusing on the “most likely” outcome or on the average outcome, robust 
control argues that policymakers should focus on and defends against the worst-case 
outcome. 
  While the robust control approach may suggest some paranoia on the part of the 
policymaker, the intuition for robust control can be found in such common expressions as 
“expect the unexpected” and “hope for the best, but prepare for the worst.”A valuable 
feature of the robust control approach is that it allows us to think about and combine 
model misspecification from the perspective of the policymaker with model 
misspecification from the perspective of households and firms. After all, there is no 
reason to think that policymakers are the only people who have to worry about model 
misspecification. 
￿ The theory establishing that robust control methods can be applied to economic 
problems has been developed largely in a series of contributions by Hansen and Sargent, 
contributions that are well summarized in Hansen and Sargent (2006). Among other 
things, Hansen and Sargent show how to set up and solve discounted robust control 
problems, and they develop methods to solve for robust policies in backward-looking 
models and in forward-looking models with commitment. Giordani and Soderlind (2004) 
extend these methods to forward-looking models with discretion and to simple rules.   4
  A critical component in the application of robust control is the reference model. A 
reference model is a structural model, possibly arrived at through some (nonmodeled) 
learning process that is thought to be a good approximation to the underlying 
datagenerating process. The methods described in Hansen and Sargent (2006) and 
Giordani and Soderlind (2004) require that this reference model be written in a state-
space form, following the literature on traditional (nonrobust) optimal control. As 
discussed in Dennis (2006), while state-space methods allow models to be expressed in a 
form that contains only first-order dynamics, they also have drawbacks. In particular, 
many models cannot be expressed easily in a state-space form, especially medium- to 
largescale models for which the necessary manipulations are often prohibitive. For robust 
control problems, the state-space formulation has an additional important implication in 
that the policymaker and the fictitious “evil agent” are not treated symmetrically. 
Specifically, the planner’s decisions can affect current period outcomes both directly and 
through private sector expectations, while the evil agent’s decisions can only affect 
current period outcomes through private sector expectations. As we show in this paper, 
this feature of the traditional robust control setup means that the evil agent will introduce 
specification errors by changing the conditional means of the shock processes, but not 
their conditional volatility. 
   An alternative set of tools to solve robust control problems is based on the 
solution methods developed by Dennis (2006) that have the advantage that they do not 
require the reference model to be written in a state-space form. Instead they allow the 
reference model to be written in structural form, which is more flexible and generally 
much easier to attain than is a state-space form. The structural form also allows us to treat 
the policymaker and the evil agent symmetrically, giving rise to the result that the evil 
agent will optimally choose to change the conditional volatility of the shocks in addition 





   5
2.  The model 
 
  When solving robust control problems there are generally two distinct equilibria 
that are of interest. The first is the “worst-case” equilibrium, which is the equilibrium that 
pertains when the policymaker and private agents design policy and form expectations 
based on the worst-case misspecification and the worst-case misspecification is realized. 
The second is the “approximating” equilibrium, which is the equilibrium that pertains 
when the policymaker and private agents design policy and form expectations based on 
the worst-case misspecification, but the reference model transpires to be specified 
correctly. In this section we outline how state-space methods can be used to obtain these 
two equilibria, setting the scene for the structural-form analysis that follows.  
  According to the state – space formulation, the economic environment is one in 
which the behavior of an  1 × n  vector of endogenous variables,  t z , consisting of   1 n  
predetermined variables,  t z1 , and  ) ( 1 2 2 n n n n − =  non predetermined variables,  t z2 , are 
governed by the reference model 
 , 1 1 1 1 2 12 1 11 1 1 + + + + + = t t t t t C u B z A z A z ε      ( 1 )  
   , 2 2 22 1 21 1 2 t t t t t u B z A z A z E + + = +        ( 2 )  
where  t u  is a  1 × p  vector of control variables,  ] , 0 [ 1 s t I iid ≈ ε  is an  1 × s  vector,  1 n s ≤  
vector of white – noise innovations, and  t E  is the mathematical expectations operator 
conditional upon information available up to and including period t. The reference model 
is the model that private agents and the policy maker believe most accurately describes 
the data generating process. The matrices  2 1 22 21 12 11 , , , , , B B A A A A  contain structural 
parameteres and are conformable with  t t z z 2 1 ,  and  t u  as necessary. The matrix  1 C  is 
determined to insure that  t 1 ε  has the identity matrix as its variance – covariance matrix. 
  The policymaker’s problem is to choose a sequence for its control variables, 
∞
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where ) 1 , 0 ( ∈ β  is the discount factor. The weighting matrices,  , ,U R  and Q reflect the 
policymaker’s preferences; R  and Q are assumed to be positive semidefinite and 
positive definite, respectively.  
  Acknowledging that their reference model may be misspecified, private agents 
and the policymaker surround their reference model with a class of models of the form 
, ) ( 1 1 1 1 1 2 12 1 11 1 1 + + + + + + + = t t t t t t v C u B z A z A z ε      (4) 
   , 2 2 22 1 21 1 2 t t t t t u B z A z A z E + + = +        ( 5 )  
where  1 + t v  is a vector of specification errors, to arrive at a “distorted” model. The 
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t v v E η β                                                                                      (6) 
where  ] , 0 [ η η ∈  represents the “budget” for missspecification.  
  Because private agents form expectations that are “rational” according to the 
distorted model, the non predetermined variables and their expected values are linked 
according to 1 2 1 2 1 2 + + + + = t t t t z E z ε . The distorted model can be written as 
, ) ( 1 1 1 1 1 2 12 1 11 1 1 + + + + + + + = t t t t t t v C u B z A z A z ε      (7) 
   , 1 2 2 2 22 1 21 1 2 + + + + + = t t t t t u B z A z A z ε        ( 8 )  
or, more compactly and in obvious notation, as 
1 1 1
~
+ + + + + + = t t t t t C Cv Bu Az z ε .        ( 9 )  
  To guard against the worst case misspecification, the policymaker formulates 
policy subject to the distorted model with the view that the misspecification will be as 
damaging as possible. Private sector agents form expectations with the same view. The 
fear that the misspecification will be as damaging as possible is operationalized to the 
metaphor that  1 + t v  is chosen by an evil agent whose objectives are diametrically opposed 
to those of the policymaker. Hansen and Sargent (2001) prove that the constraint problem 
in which equation (3) is minimized with respect to 
∞
0 } { t u  and maximized with respect to 
∞
1 } { t v , subject to equations (9) and (6), can be recast in terms of an equivalent multiplier 






+ + ′ − ′ + ′ + ′
t
t t t t t t t t
t v v Qu u Uu z Rz z E θ β        ( 1 0 )  
is minimized with respect to 
∞
0 } { t u  and maximized with respect to 
∞
1 } { t v , subject to 
equation (9). The parameter  ) , [ ∞ ∈ θ θ  is a shadow price that is inversely related to the 
budget for misspecificationη . Specifically, asη  approaches 0, θ  approaches infinity. 
  
  Robust policymaking with commitment using state – space methods 
 
In the commitment solution, both the policymaker and the evil agent are assumed 
to commit to a policy strategy and not succumb to incentives to renege on that strategy. 
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the optimization problem can be written as  
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subject to  
1 1
~ ~
+ + + + = t t t t C u B Az z ε ,         ( 1 4 )  
which, because the first – order conditions for a maximum are the same as those for a 
minimum, has a form that can be solved using the methods developed by Backus and 
Drifill (1986). Those methods involve formulating the problem as linear – quadratic, the 
value function has the form  d Vz z z V t t t + ′ = ) (  and the dynamic program can be written as 
)] ( ~ ~ ~ ~ ~
2 [ max min 1 1
1
d Vz z E u Q u u U z Rz z d Vz z t t t t t t t t t
v u t t
t t
+ ′ + ′ + ′ ′ + ′ = + ′ + +
+
β .   (15) 
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where  t p2  is an  1 2 × n  vector of shadow prices associated with the non predetermined 
variables,  t z2 . The matrix T  provides a mapping between the state variables,  t z1  and 












T ,          ( 1 9 )  
where  21 V  and  22 V  are submatrices of V . Finally, V  and F  are obtained by solving for 













1 VA B U B V B Q F ′ + ′ ′ + =
− β β        ( 2 1 )  
  When the worst case misspecification is realized, the economy behaves according 
to equations (16) – (18). While the worst case equilibrium is certainly interesting, it is 
also important to consider how the economy behaves when the reference model transpires 
to be specified correctly. Partitioning F  into  ] [ ′ ′ ′ v u F F  where  u F  and  v F  are 
conformable with  t u  and  1 + t v , respectively. Dennis (2005) shows that the approximating 
equilibrium has the form  




z t C p F B H A z F B H A A z ε ,   (22) 
t t t p M z M p 2 22 1 21 1 2 + = + ,         ( 2 3 )  
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  Interestingly, the worst-case equilibrium and the approximating equilibrium share 
certain features. For instance, the worst-case equilibrium and the approximating 
equilibrium differ only with respect to the law of motion for the predetermined variables 
and, as a consequence, following innovations to the system the initial-period responses of 
the predetermined variables are the same for the approximating equilibrium as for the 
worst-case equilibrium. But since the decision rules for  t z2 and  t u  are also the same for 
the two equilibria, it follows that the initial-period responses by the nonpredetermined 
variables and by the policy variables are also the same. With respect to impulse response 
functions, differences between the approximating equilibrium and the worst-case 
equilibrium then only occur one period after innovations occur. 
  Furthermore, because the coefficient matrix on the innovations is  1 C , which 
scales the standard deviations of the innovations, it follows that adding noise to the 
innovations or changing their correlation structure is not part of the evil agent’s strategy. 
Instead, the optimally designed misspecification has the effect of changing the law of 
motion for the predetermined variables. More precisely, since the specification errors 
enter only the stochastic component of t z1 , the evil agent’s strategy is to change the 
conditional means of the shock processes but not their conditional volatility. As shown in 
Appendix A, these relationships between the worst-case and the approximating 
equilibria also hold under discretion. 
 
2.2  Robust policymaking with discretion using state – space methods 
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t t t t t t
t
v u u Q u u U z Rz z E
t t
β ,       ( 2 7 )  
subject to  
1 1 1 1 2 12 1 11 1 1
~ ~
+ + + + + = t t t t t C u B z A z A z ε ,      ( 2 8 )  
t t t t t u B z A z A z E ~ ~
2 2 22 1 21 1 2 + + = + ,        ( 2 9 )  
but now neither the policymaker nor the evil agent can commit. A convenient way to 
solve this dynamic optimisation problem is to apply the method presented by Backus and   10
Drifill (1986). Conjecturing that the solution for the non – predetermined variables in 
period  1 + t  has the form 
1 1 1 2 + + = t t Hz z ,           ( 3 0 )  
equations (28) – (30) imply that the non – predetermined variables,  t z2 , depend on the 
predetermined variables,  t z1 , and the control variables,  t u ~ , according to 
  t t t u K Jz z ~
1 2 + = ,          ( 3 1 )  
where 
) ( ) ( 11 21
1
22 12 HA A A HA J − − ≡
−        ( 3 2 )  
  Using (31) to substitute the non – predetermined variables out of the objective 
function, the dynamic program for the optimisation problem with discretion is  
  )] ( ~ 2 [ max min 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
1
k Pz z E u U z z R z k Pz z t t t t t t t v u t t
t t
+ ′ + ′ + ′ ≡ + ′ + +
+
β ,   (33) 
where  
J R J R J J R R R 22 21 12 11 ′ + ′ + + ≡ ,        ( 3 4 )  
2 1 22 12
~ ~
U J U K R J K R U ′ ′ + + ′ + ≡ ,        ( 3 5 )  
Q U K K U K R K Q
~ ~
2 2 22 + ′ + ′ + ′ ≡ ,        ( 3 6 )  
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t t z KF J z 1 2 ) ( − = ,          ( 3 8 )  
1 1 1 1 1 12 11 1 1 )
~
( + + + − + = t t t C z F B H A A z ε      ( 3 9 )  
where P and F are obtained by solving for the fix – point of  
) ( ) ( 11 21
1
22 12 HA A A HA J − − ≡
− ,        ( 4 0 )  
)
~ ~
( ) ( 1 2
1
22 12 B H B A HA K − − ≡
− ,        ( 4 1 )  
J A A A 12 11 11
~
+ ≡ ,          ( 4 2 )  
1 12 12
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KF J H − =           ( 4 6 )  
With the worst case equilibrium given by equations (37) – (39), partitioning 
F into [] v u F F ′ ′  where  u F  and   v F  are conformable with  t u  and 1 + t v , respectively, the 
approximating equilibrium is derived from equations (37) – (39) by setting  0 = v F . 
 
2.3  Robust policymaking with commitment using structural methods 
 
￿ While state-space solution methods have many advantages, being generally 
compact and containing only first-order dynamics, they are not always convenient. In 
particular, problems can arise from the fact that it is often difficult, sometimes 
prohibitively so, to manipulate a model into a state-space form, making state-space 
methods better suited to small models. But policymakers often employ medium- to large-
scale models, and for this reason alone it is desirable to be able to solve robust control 
problems without relying on state-space methods. In this regard, Dennis (2006) has 
developed numerical methods that solve for optimal commitment policies and optimal 
discretionary policies in rational expectations models that allow the optimization 
constraints to be written in a structural form. These structural-form solution methods are 
easy to apply and offer considerable flexibility with regard to how the model is 
expressed. 
  One contribution of this section is to show that these structural-form methods can 
be readily applied to solve robust control problems. In fact, the advantages to using 
structural-form methods may extend somewhat further than convenience and flexibility. 
Leitemo and S¨oderstr¨om (2004, 2005) use a Lagrangian method—with the constraints 
in a structural form—to solve analytically for robustly optimal discretionary policies in 
closed- and open-economy models, respectively. They find that the evil agent’s optimal 
strategy is to change the variances of the shocks, not their persistence, a strategy that 
differs from what the state-space methods outlined above would suggest. 
  In addition to illustrating how structural-form methods can be used to solve robust 
control problems numerically, we demonstrate that they need not generate the same worst 
case equilibrium as the state-space methods and explain why. We note that whereas with 
state-space methods the evil agent’s strategy is to change the conditional means of the   12
shocks, with structural-form methods the evil agent will generally choose to change both 
the conditional means and the variance/covariance structure of the shocks. As we show, 
these differences arise because the structural-form solution methods change slightly the 
nature of the game played between the agents in the model, accommodating a more 
general class of specification errors in the process. Finally, we outline how detection-
error probabilities, essentially, the probability that an econometrician would make a 
model selection error, can be calculated given this more general class of specification 
errors. 
  The basic representation that Dennis (2006) works with is the second – order 
structural form. Therefore, let the reference model be represented as  
t t t t t t A u A y E A y A y A ε 4 3 1 2 1 1 0 + + + = + − ,       ( 4 7 )  
where  t y  is an  1 × n  vector of endogenous variables,  t u  is a  1 × p  vector of policy 
instruments,  t ε  is an  1 × s ,  n s ≤ ≤ 0 , vector of innovations, and  3 2 1 0 , , , A A A A  and  4 A  
are matrices with dimensions conformable with  t t u y ,  and  t ε  that contain the structural 
parameters. The matrix  0 A  is assumed to be nonsingular and the elements of  4 A  are 
determined to ensure that shocks are distributed according to  ] , 0 [ 1 s t I iid ≈ ε . The dating 
on the variables is such that any variable that enters  1 − t y  is known by the beginning of 
periodt; by construction the variables in  1 − t y  are predetermined. Binder and Pesaran 
(1995) show that this second – order structural form encompasses an enormous class of 
(log-) linear macroeconomic models.  
  With the reference model written in second – order structural form, private agents 
and the policymaker acknowledge their concern for misspecification by surrounding their 
reference model with a class of models of the form  
, ) ( 4 3 1 2 1 1 0 t t t t t t t v A u A y E A y A y A ε + + + + = + −       ( 4 8 )  
where  t v  is a vector containing specification errors and equation (48) represents the 
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where  ) , 0 [ w w∈  represents the evil agent’s total budget of misspecification. 
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t Qu u Wy y E β ,         ( 5 0 )  
where ) ( n n W ×  and  ) ( p p Q ×  are matrices containing policy weights and are symmetric 
positive semidefinite, and symmetric positive definite, respectively. Penalty terms on the 
interaction between  t y  and  t u  could be included, but are unnecessary because such terms 
can be accomodated through a suitable construction of t y , reflecting the greater flexibility 
offered by the structural form.  
  Analogous to the state – space approach, the problem of minimizing equation (50) 
with respect to 
∞
0 } { t u  and maximizing with respect to 
∞
0 } { t v  subject to equations (48) and 
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t v v Qu u Wy y E φ β ,        ( 5 1 )  
is minimized with respect to 
∞
0 } { t u  and maximized with respect to 
∞
0 } { t v  subject to 
equation (48). The multiplier  ) , [ ∞ ∈ φ φ  is inversely related to the budget for 
misspecification, ω . This method of formulating the robust control problem with the 
reference model and the distorted model in structural form parallels Hansen and Sargent 
(2006) closely. Nevertheless, we distinguish between ω  and η  and between φ  and θ  to 
acknowledge that φ  and θ , while they are both shadow prices, need not share the same 
interpretation and that ω  and η  need not take the same value.  
  To solve the robust control problem with commitment when the constraints are in 
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and 
y
t t t A A ε ε ρ 2 4 − ≡ , with  1 1 + + − ≡ t t t
y
t y E y ε . The first – order conditions with respect 
to t t u λ , ~ , and  t y , respectively, can be written as 
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with the initial condition that  0 1 = − t λ . Equations (54) – (56) describe a standard system 
of expectational equations, in which the expectations are formed rationally from the 
perspective of the distorted model and can be solved in a variety of ways. However this 




















































F F u ε
λ










1 ~ .         ( 5 8 )  
Equations (57) and (58) describe how the economy behaves in the worst – case 
equilibrium.  
  Given the worst case equilibrium, the approximating equilibrium, which is the 
equilibrium that pertains when the reference model is actually correctly specified, is  
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  Recall that for the state-space solution methods there were certain relationships 
between the worst-case equilibrium and the approximating equilibrium, relationships that 
held for both commitment and discretion. Specifically, the evil agent’s strategy involved 
changing the persistence properties of the shocks, but not the volatility of the innovations,   15
which meant that the initial period responses of the predetermined variables, the non-
predetermined variables, and the policy controls to innovations would be the same for the 
worst-case equilibrium and the approximating equilibrium. Using the structural-form 
solution methods described above, however, these relationships do not necessarily hold. 
  To see this, note that the contemporaneous response of  t y  to  t ε  is  ε y G  in the 
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−  in the 
approximating equilibrium (see equation (61)). When these structural-form methods are 
employed, the evil agent’s strategy may well involve a change to the variance-covariance 
matrix of the innovations as well as a change to the conditional means of the shock 
processes. It follows that the initial period responses by the endogenous variables, and 
hence also by the policy controls, to innovations may also differ between the worst-case 




2.4  Robust policymaking with discretion using structural methods 
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4 3 1 2 1 1 0 t t t t t t A u A y E A y A y A ε + + + = + −         ( 6 3 )  
but, of course, neither the policymaker nor the evil agent can commit. The policymaker 
and the evil agent are Stackelberg leaders with respect to their future selves, but play a 
Cournot game between themselves. The problem described by equations (62) and (63) 
conforms to the class of problems studied and solved by Dennis (2006), where it is shown 
that the solution takes the form 
, 1 t t t G Hy y ε + = −          ( 6 4 )  
 . ~
2 1 1 t t t F y F u ε + = −          ( 6 5 )    16
 The  matrices  1 , , F G H  and  2 F  that govern the solution are arrived at through an 
iterative procedure. The first step involves conjecturing values for H  and  1 F  and using 
these to solve for the matrix Dand the fix-point P  according to 
H A A D 2 0 − ≡ ,          ( 6 6 )  
PH H F Q F W P ′ + ′ + ≡ β β 1 1
~
.         ( 6 7 )  
  Next, the values for D and P  that solve equations (66) and (67) are used together 
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  From equations (68) – (71), updates of D and the fix – point P  are generated, 
which in turn give rise to updated values for  H F F , , 2 1  andG . This iterative procedure 
continues until a fix – point in which  G H F F , , , 2 1  and P  no longer change with 
successive iterations is obtained. 
  Equations (64) and (65) govern the economy’s behavior in the worst-case 
equilibrium. From this worst-case equilibrium, the approximating equilibrium can be 
easily constructed; it is given by 
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t F y F u ε 2 1 1 + = − ,          ( 7 3 )  
where equation (72) exploits the fact that  0 A  has full rank. 
  As one might expect, in the discretionary solution, just as in the commitment 
solution discussed above, the evil agent’s strategy will generally involve changing both 
the persistence properties of the shocks and the variance-covariance matrix of the 
innovations. To see this, observe from equations (64) and (72) that the coefficient 
matrices on the innovations,G , and 
u F A HG A A 2 3 2 4 + + , respectively, are not necessarily 
equal. 
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2.5  Detection – error probabilities 
 
￿ Anderson, Hansen, and Sargent (2003) describe the concept of a detection-error 
probability and introduce it as a tool for calibratingφ , the multiplier on the 
misspecification constraint, which would otherwise be a free parameter. A detection-error 
probability is the probability that an econometrician observing equilibrium outcomes 
would make an incorrect inference about whether the approximating equilibrium or the 
worst-case equilibrium generated the data. The intuitive connection between φ  and the 
probability of making a detection error is that when φ  is small, greater differences 
between the distorted model and the reference model (more severe misspecifications) can 
arise, which are more easily detected. Let  A and B  denote two models; with a prior that 
assigns equal weight to each model, Hansen, Sargent, and Wang (2002) show that 
detection – error probabilities are calculated according to 
2
) | ( ) | (
) (
A B prob B A prob
p
+
= φ ,        ( 7 4 )  
where ) | ( B A prob  () | ( A B prob ) represents the probability that the econometrician 
errouneously chooses model  A (model B ) when in fact model B  (model  A) generated 
the data. Let model  A denote the approximating model and model B denote the 
worstcase model, then any sequence of specification errors that satisfies equation (29) 
will be at least as difficult to distinguish from the approximating model as is a sequence 
that satisfies equation (29) with equality. As such,  ) (φ p  represents a lower bound on the 
probability of making a detection error. 
  To calculate a detection-error probability we require a description of how the 
econometrician goes about choosing one model over another. Hansen, Sargent, and Wang 
(2002) assume that this model selection is based on the likelihood ratio principle. Let 
T B
t z 1 } {  denote a finite sequence of economic outcomes generated according to the worst – 
case equilibrium, modelB , and let  AB L  and  BB L  denote the likelihood associated with 
models  A and B , respectively, then the econometrician chooses model  A over model B  




BB L L . Generating M  independent sequences 
T B
t z 1 } {,  ) | ( B A prob  can be 













0 ) / log(
1
) | ( ,         ( 7 5 )  




BB L L I  is the indicator function that equals one when its argument is 
satisfied and equals zero otherwise;   ) | ( A B prob  is calculated analogously using draws 
generated from the approximating model. The likelihood function that is generally used 
to calculate  ) | ( B A prob  and  ) | ( A B prob  assumes that the innovations are normally 
distributed.  
  While the theory of detection does not require that the evil agent not distort the 
volatility of the innovations, existing methods to calculate detection-error probabilities do 
(see Hansen, Sargent, and Wang, 2002, for example). Dennis, Leitemo and Soderstrom 
(2006) propose a more general method to calculate detection-error probabilities while 
accounting for the distortions to both the conditional means and the conditional 
volatilities of the shocks. Let 
t A t A t G z H z ε + = −1 ,          ( 7 6 )  
t B t B t G z H z ε + = −1 ,          ( 7 7 )  
govern equilibrium outcomes under the approximating equilibrium and the worst – case 
equilibrium, respectively. With discretion,  t t y z ≡ , while with commitment 
[] ′ ′ ′ ≡ t t t y z λ . When  B A G G ≠ , to calculate  ) (φ p  we must first allow for the stochastic 
singularity that generally characterizes equilibrium and second account appropriately for 
the Jacobian of transformation that enters the likelihood function. Using the QR 
decomposition we decompose  A G  according to  A A A R Q G =  and  B G  according to 
B B B R Q G = . By construction,  A Q  and  B Q  are orthogonal matrices ( s b B A A I Q Q Q Q = ′ = ′ ) 
and  A R  and  B R  are upper triangular. Let 
} , { } , { , ) ( ˆ 1






t ∈ − ′ = −
− ε       ( 7 8 )  
represent the inferred innovations in period t when model i is fitted to the data 
T j
t z 1 } { 
that are generated according to model  j  and let 
j i| ˆ Σ  be the associated estimates of the 
innovation variance – covariance matrices. Then    19
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AA tr R R
L
L





⎛ − − ,      ( 7 9 )  




| | 1 1 B B B A
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BB tr R R
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⎛ − − ,      ( 8 0 )  
where tr  is the trace operator.  
 When  B A G G =  it follows that  B A R R = and the Jacobian of transformations 
associated with the various likelihoods cancel and play no role in the calculations, in 
which case equations (79) and (80) simplify to 















,     ( 8 1 )  















,     ( 8 2 )  
which are equivalent to the expressions Hansen, Sargent, and Wang (2002) and Hansen 
and Sargent (2006, Chapter 8) employ. Given equations (79) and (80), equation (75) is 
used to estimate  ) | ( B A prob  and (similarly)  ) | ( A B prob , which are needed to construct 
the detection – error probability, as per equation (74). The multiplier,φ , is then 
determined by selecting a detection – error probability (or at least its lower bound) and 
inverting equation (74). Generally, this inversion is performed numerically by 
constructing the mapping between φ  and the detection – error probability, for a given 
sample size.  
 
  2.6  Comparing the solution methods 
 
  We demonstrated that the solutions obtained for the worst-case equilibrium and 
the approximating equilibrium may depend on whether state-space methods or structural-
form methods are used. Moreover, it should be clear that the differences between the two 
solution methods involve specification errors that are qualitatively different in important 
ways. For the structural-form solution methods, it is apparent that pessimistic agents are 
guarding against specification errors both to the conditional means of the shocks, which   20
is the behavior Hansen and Sargent emphasize, and to the conditional 
variances/covariances of the shocks.  
  In an important sense, it is surprising that the solutions differ, as such differences 
do not arise when expectations are rational. But since the methods may produce different 
equilibrium behavior, two important questions immediately present themselves: why do 
the differences arise, and are the differences quantitatively important? With regard to the 
first question, when the solutions differ they do so because the state-space formulation 
restricts the various decisionmakers in ways that the structural-form formulation does not. 
In effect, the two methods are solving closely related, but not identical problems. To see 
this point, consider the following simple example. Let the reference model that the 
policymaker and private agents share be 
t t t t t g u y E y + + = + γ α 1 ,         ( 8 3 )  
t t t g g ε σ ρ ε + = −1 ,          ( 8 4 )  
where the parameters satisfy  ) 1 , 1 ( ), , ( ), 1 , 0 ( − ∈ +∞ −∞ ∈ ∈ ρ γ α , and  ) , 0 ( , ∞ ∈ ε σ σ g , and 
where  t ε  is a mean – zero white – noise process with standard deviation equal to  ε σ . 
Notice that  t ε  is an exogenous variable,  t u  is a decision variable,  1 , + t t t y E y , and  t g  are 
non – predetermined variables, and  1 − t g  is a predetermined variable.  
  To write equations (83) and (84) in state-space form the standard method would 
be to advance the timing on equation (84) one period and to make Etyt+1 the subject of 
equation (83), giving 





























































ε .   (85) 
  Adding the specification errors, the distorted model would then be  




























































ε .    (86) 
  Notice that in equation (86) the shock  t g  is a state variable, a variable that all 
agents take as given when forming decisions, even though it is not actually a 
predetermined variable.    21
  In contrast, with the structural form method, once the model misspecifications are 
added to equation (64), becomes 
















































































  In equation (87) the state variables that agents take as given when forming 
decisions are  1 − t g  and t ε . Thus, the key difference between the two representations is that 
in the structural-form representation the state variables are 1 − t g , which is predetermined, 
and t ε , which is exogenous, while in the state-space representation the state variable 
is  t g ,which is non-predetermined. Because the structural-form representation allows the 
evil agent to react separately to  1 − t g  and t ε , if it so desires the evil agent can purposefully 
alter the realization of  t g , changing both the conditional mean of the shock and the 
variance of the innovation. Moreover, by allowing the specification errors to affect the 
contemporaneous realizations of the shocks, the nature of the strategic interaction 
between the policymaker and the evil agent is changed slightly by the structural form. 
  Before leaving this section, two final points are worth making. First, although the 
structural-form representation does not restrict the state vector, and permits a wider class 
of specification errors as a consequence, because all agents in the model—not just the 
evil agent—have their behavior restricted it is not the case that relaxing this restriction 
necessarily allows the evil agent to do more damage for a given budget. By relaxing the 
restriction, other agents in the economy can better guard against the specification errors. 
Second, state-space forms (and structural forms) are not unique. As a consequence, for 
any given model, a state-space representation that allows the evil agent to distort both the 
conditional mean and the conditional volatility of the shocks will generally be available. 
  
2.7  Robust policy in an empirical model 
 
  To illustrate the robust control approach, we study the model estimated by 
Rudebusch (2002a), which is based on a standard New Keynesian model and contains   22
two equations that, conditional upon the short – term interest rate,  t i , summarize the 
dynamics of inflation,  t π , and the dynamics of inflation,  t y : 
t t t t t t y E , 1 1 ) 1 ( π π π ε α π μ π μ π + + − + = − + ,       ( 8 8 )  
t y t t t t y t t y t E i y E y , 1 1 1 ) ( ) 1 ( ε π β μ π μ + − − − + = + − +        ( 8 9 )  
  Equation (88) is a “New Keynesian Phillips curve” derived from the optimal 
pricesetting behavior of firms acting under monopolistic competition, but facing price 
rigidities, typically modeled following Calvo (1983). The presence of lagged inflation 
and the “supply shock”  t , π ε  can be motivated by indexing those prices that are not 
reoptimized in a given period and by a time-varying elasticity of substitution across 
goods, leading to time-varying markups. Equation (89) can be derived from the 
household consumption Euler equation, where habits in consumption imply that current 
decisions depend to some extent on past decisions. The “demand shock”  t y, ε  can be 
attributed to government spending shocks or to movements in the natural level of output.8 
An empirical version of this model, suitable for quarterly data and similar to that 
estimated by Rudebusch (2002a), is given by 
t t y
j
j t j t t t y E , 1
4
1
3 1 ) 1 ( π π π π ε α π α μ π μ π + + − + = −
=
− + − ∑ ,      ( 9 0 )  
 
t y t t t r
j
j t yj y t t y t E i y y E y , 3 1 1
2
1
1 1 ) ( ) 1 ( ε π β β μ μ + − − − + = + − −
=








j t t π π  is four – quarter inflation and  t i  is the nominal federal funds rate 
(the policy instrument). We generalize the model slightly to include forward – looking 
behavior in the output gap equation, as in Rudebusch (2002b). The model’s parameters 
estimates, shown in Table 1, are taken from Rudebusch (2002a) and are obtained using 
OLS (and survey expectations) on quarterly U.S. data from 1968:Q3 to 1996:Q4, except 
for the parameter  y μ , which is set to the average estimate in Fuhrer and Rudebusch 
(2004).  
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Table 1 – Parameter Values 
Inflation Output  Monetary  Policy 
π μ   0.29  y μ   0.20  β   0.99 
1 π α   0.07  1 y β   1.15  λ   0.50 
2 π α   -0.14  2 y β   -0.27  υ   0.10 
3 π α   0.40  r β   0.09    
4 π α   0.07  y σ   0.833    
y α   0.13      
π σ   1.012      
 
  The model’s key features are that inflation and the output gap are highly 
persistent, that monetary policy affects the economy only with a lag, and that 
expectations are formed using period  1 − t  information. Notice, also, that the weights on 
expected future inflation and output. While consistent with much of the empirical 
literature, are small relative to many theory – based specifications.  











i vi y E
t
λ π β ,        ( 9 2 )  
where we  1 . 0 , 5 . 0 , 99 . 0 = = = v λ β . Thus, the central bank sets monetary policy to avoid 
volatility in inflation around its target (normalized to zero) and in the output gap around 
zero (precluding any discretionary inflation bias). In addition, the central bank desires to 
limit volatility in the nominal interest rate around target (normalized to zero). The 
concern for misspecification,φ , is chosen so that the detection error probability is 0.1, 
given a sample of 200 observations. This implies that  5 . 54 = θ .  
  The model described by relations (90) – (92) can be written in state – space form 
as follows: 
1 1 + + + + = t t t t C Bu Az z ε ,         ( 9 3 )  







t t t t
t
u Qu u Rz z E
t
β           ( 9 4 )    24
where   () ′ = − − − − 1 3 2 1 1 t t t t t t t y y z π π π π ,  
  () ′ = + + + + 1 3 2 1 2 t t t t t t t t t y E E E E z π π π , 












  () ′ = yt t t ε ε ε π , 



































− − − − − −
=
0 0 0 44 . 1 08 . 1 4 . 4 077 . 0 44 . 0 15 . 0 74 . 0
0 1 1 79 . 12 0 79 . 1 69 . 0 92 . 3 37 . 1 56 . 6
0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
A , 
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0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 5 . 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
R , 
 1 . 0 = Q  
 
  We first solved the linear quadratic optimization problem in the nonrobust case. 
The matrix which gives the optimal feedback is  
( ) 4.296 - 16.047 - 40.245 41.088 - 2.399   6.947 - 0.913   3.54 10.36 - 20.1 = K
(95) 
and the optimal control is: 
t t t t Kz Fz i u − = = = .          ( 9 6 )  
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5 . 54 0 0
0 5 . 54 0
0 0 1 . 0
Q . 
 Matrices  A, C and R are the same as in the nonrobust case.  












− − − − − − −
− − − − − −
− − − − − −
=
206 . 0 33 . 0 62 . 0 99 . 2 0008 . 0 422 . 0 152 . 0 83 . 0 472 . 0 4969 . 1
216 . 0 055 . 0 97 . 1 26 . 3 0005 . 0 315 . 0 125 . 0 61 . 0 783 . 0 4045 . 1
22 . 0 38 . 3 22 . 1 99 . 0 3038 . 2 741 . 9 302 . 0 65 . 1 992 . 0 6733 . 1
K  
(97)  
  The optimal control is given by t t z K u − = , which means that the optimal policy 
rule and misspecification are given by: 
Coefficient on 
  t π   1 − t π   2 − t π   3 − t π   t y   1 − t y  
Policy rule  
t i  
-1.6733 -0.992  1.65  0.302  9.741  0.99 
Misspeficiation 
1 , + t vπ   1.4045 -0.783  0.61  0.125  0.315 0.0005 
1 , + t y v   1.4969 -0.472  0.83  0.152  0.422 0.0008 
 
 
In figures 1, 2, we plot impulse responses to unit – sized innovations to inflation ( t , π ε ) 
under commitment using the state – space method, for the nonrobust and robust cases, 
respectively.  
   27
 
  Figure  1      Figure  2 
 
Figures 3 and 4 illustrate output responses to unit – sized innovations to inflation ( t , π ε ) 
for the nonrobust and robust cases, respectively.  
 
        Figure 3                 Figure 4 
 
 
  Figures 5 and 6 illustrate interest rate responses to unit – sized innovations to 
inflation ( t , π ε ) for the nonrobust and robust cases, respectively.    28
 
        Figure 5               Figure 6 
 
  Under the nonrobust policy, a shock to inflation is followed by a prolonged period 
of high inflation, causing the central bank to tighten monetary policy and to raise the 
interest rate in order to open up a negative output gap, which will reduce inflation over 
time. 
  Using the state-space solution method in Figure 2, the misspecification has no 
effect in the initial period. In subsequent periods, however, the evil agent’s actions, which 
make inflation more persistent in the worst-case equilibrium, produce a more aggressive 
policy response and a larger negative output gap and the effect on the output gap is 
considerably larger and more persistent. The more aggressive policy implies that the 
output gap is larger than under the nonrobust policy, and inflation therefore returns to 
target faster. Thus, the robust policy is more aggressive than the nonrobust policy, and 
the central bank fears mainly that inflation is more persistent than is reflected in the 
reference model. Giordani and Soderlind (2004) and Dennis, Leitemo and Soderstrom 
(2006) obtain qualitatively similar results. 
  Similar differences are obtained in response to output shocks (see Figures 6–12). 
Although the initial period distortion is small, the total effect is substantially larger and 
leads to quantitatively important differences between the two approaches.  
  Figures 7 and 8 illustrate inflation responses to unit – sized innovations to the 
output gap ( t y, ε ) for the nonrobust and robust cases, respectively.    29
 
        Figure 7                Figure 8 
  
  Figures 9 and 10 illustrate output gap responses to unit – sized innovations to the 
output gap ( t y, ε ) for the nonrobust and robust cases, respectively. 
 




  Figures 11 and 12 illustrate interest rate responses to unit – sized innovations to 
the output gap ( t y, ε ) for the nonrobust and robust cases, respectively.   30
 




  In formulating monetary policy, central banks must cope with substantial 
economic uncertainty. 
  Economic uncertainty can arise from different sources: the state of the economy, 
the nature of economic relationships, and the magnitude and persistence of ongoing 
shocks. 
  Robust control theory instructs decision makers to investigate the fragility of 
decision rules by conducting worst-case analyses. 
  In this paper we show how state space methods and structural-form solution 
methods can be applied to robust control problems, thereby making it easier to analyze 
complex models. 
  We illustrate the state space solution methods by applying them to an empirical 
New Keynesian business cycle model of the genre widely used to study monetary policy 
under rational expectations. A key finding from this exercise is that the strategically 
designed specification errors will tend to distort the Phillips curve in an effort to make 
inflation more persistent, and hence harder and more costly to stabilize. The optimal 
response to these distortions is for the central bank to become more activist in its 
response to shocks.  
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